20 research outputs found
Politics, Deception, and Being Self-Deceived
A review of Anna Elisabeth Galeotti's "Political Self-Deception
The Problem of Fake News
Looking at the recent spate of claims about âfake newsâ which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. Te phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indiference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. Tis indiference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to fourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the âpublicâ epistemology that maintains what is considered ârationalâ public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology by injecting a certain ethical consideration back into the discourse
What is fake news?
Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of âfake newsâ. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate
The Iniquity of the Conspiracy Inquirers
A reply to âWhy âHealthy Conspiracy Theoriesâ Are (Oxy)moronsâ by Pascal Wagner-Egger, GĂ©rald Bronner, Sylvain DelouvĂ©e, Sebastian Dieguez and Nicolas Gauvrit
Avoiding the Stereotyping of the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories: A Reply to Hill
Iâm to push back on Hillâs (2022) criticism in four ways. First: we need some context for the debate that occurred in the pages of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective that so concerns Hill. Second: getting precise with our terminology (and not working with stereotypes) is the only theoretically fruitful way to approach the problem of conspiracy theories. Third: I address Hillâs claim there is no evidence George W. Bush or Tony Blair accused their critics, during the build-up the invasion of Iraq in 2003ACE, as being âconspiracy theorists.â Fourth (and finally): I will gently suggest that Hill has succumbed to a stereotypical view of work in Philosophy on conspiracy theories
Does the Phrase âConspiracy Theoryâ Matter?
Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695â705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase âconspiracy theoryâ has no negative effect upon peopleâs willingness to endorse a claim. We revisit Woodâs findings and its (re)uptake in the recent literature. Is the label âconspiracy theoryâ a pejorative? If so, does it sway or affect peopleâs belief in specific claims of conspiracy (i.e. particular conspiracy theories), or is the effect one that concerns claims of conspiracy more generally (i.e. all conspiracy theories)? Through an examination of the conceptual and methodological scope of Woodâs work and the results of our similar quasi-experimental design, we argue that it is premature to suggest the label âconspiracy theoryâ has no impact on the believability of a claim, or that it has no rhetorical power
Understanding conspiracy theories
Scholarly efforts to understand conspiracy theories have grown significantly in recent years, and there is now a broad and interdisciplinary literature that we review in this article. We ask three specific questions. First, what are the factors that are associated with conspiracy theorizing? Our review of the literature shows that conspiracy beliefs result from a range of psychological, political and social factors. Next, how are conspiracy theories communicated? Here, we explain how conspiracy theories are shared among individuals and spread through traditional and social media platforms. Next, what are the risks and rewards associated with conspiracy theories? By focusing on politics and science, we argue that conspiracy theories do more harm than good. Finally, because this is a growing literature and many open questions remain, we conclude by suggesting several promising avenues for future research